Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jesus, William Lycan and Susan A. Gelman

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87 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman]
Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman]
Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman]
Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman]
Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman]
Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman]
We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman]
Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan]
It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Jesus said learning was unnecessary, and only the spirit of the Law was needed [Jesus, by Johnson,P]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love your enemies [Jesus]
Love thy neighbour as thyself [Jesus]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Treat others as you would have them treat you [Jesus]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 4. Value of Authority
Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy [Jesus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Except ye become as little children, ye shall not enter heaven [Jesus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
If you lust after a woman, you have committed adultery [Jesus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth [Jesus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Don't resist evil, but turn the other cheek [Jesus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
It is almost impossible for the rich to go to heaven [Jesus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman]
Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
No one is good except God [Jesus]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Jesus turned the ideas of Hillel into a theology reduced to its moral elements [Jesus, by Johnson,P]