Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jeremiah, Verity Harte and Gabriel M.A. Segal

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

28 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
15842 An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
15841 Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15858 Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
15848 Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
15837 What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
15839 If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
15838 The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
7346 Jeremiah implied a link between weakness and goodness, and the evil of the state [Jeremiah, by Johnson,P]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
22920 Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord [Jeremiah]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
22089 Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? [Jeremiah]