Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jeremiah, Robert C. Solomon and Cynthia Macdonald

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61 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C]
Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C]
The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C]
A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C]
The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon]
Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon]
The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon]
Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon]
Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon]
Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon]
Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon]
The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon]
Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon]
It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon]
Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon]
The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Jeremiah implied a link between weakness and goodness, and the evil of the state [Jeremiah, by Johnson,P]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord [Jeremiah]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? [Jeremiah]