41 ideas
| 8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 10888 | Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo] |
| 10889 | The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo] |
| 10890 | A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo] |
| 10886 | Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo] |
| 10887 | Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo] |
| 10897 | A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo] |
| 10893 | Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo] |
| 10899 | Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo] |
| 10896 | Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo] |
| 10898 | The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo] |
| 10902 | We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo] |
| 10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |
| 10895 | 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo] |
| 10900 | Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo] |
| 10901 | Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo] |
| 10894 | A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo] |
| 10903 | A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo] |
| 10891 | If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
| 8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
| 8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
| 7346 | Jeremiah implied a link between weakness and goodness, and the evil of the state [Jeremiah, by Johnson,P] |
| 8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
| 8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
| 8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
| 22920 | Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord [Jeremiah] |
| 22089 | Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? [Jeremiah] |