Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jeremiah, Eric R. Scerri and William Lycan

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74 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
The periodic system is the big counterexample to Kuhn's theory of revolutionary science [Scerri]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientists eventually seek underlying explanations for every pattern [Scerri]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The periodic table suggests accommodation to facts rates above prediction [Scerri]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan]
Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Jeremiah implied a link between weakness and goodness, and the evil of the state [Jeremiah, by Johnson,P]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Natural kinds are what are differentiated by nature, and not just by us [Scerri]
If elements are natural kinds, might the groups of the periodic table also be natural kinds? [Scerri]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy [Scerri]
If all elements are multiples of one (of hydrogen), that suggests once again that matter is unified [Scerri]
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
Does radioactivity show that only physics can explain chemistry? [Scerri]
A big chemistry idea is that covalent bonds are shared electrons, not transfer of electrons [Scerri]
How can poisonous elements survive in the nutritious compound they compose? [Scerri]
Periodicity and bonding are the two big ideas in chemistry [Scerri]
Chemistry does not work from general principles, but by careful induction from large amounts of data [Scerri]
The electron is the main source of chemical properties [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
It is now thought that all the elements have literally evolved from hydrogen [Scerri]
19th C views said elements survived abstractly in compounds, but also as 'material ingredients' [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Elements were ordered by equivalent weight; later by atomic weight; finally by atomic number [Scerri]
Moseley showed the elements progress in units, and thereby clearly identified the gaps [Scerri]
Elements are placed in the table by the number of positive charges - the atomic number [Scerri]
The best classification needs the deepest and most general principles of the atoms [Scerri]
Moseley, using X-rays, showed that atomic number ordered better than atomic weight [Scerri]
Some suggested basing the new periodic table on isotopes, not elements [Scerri]
Elements in the table are grouped by having the same number of outer-shell electrons [Scerri]
Orthodoxy says the periodic table is explained by quantum mechanics [Scerri]
To explain the table, quantum mechanics still needs to explain order of shell filling [Scerri]
Since 99.96% of the universe is hydrogen and helium, the periodic table hardly matters [Scerri]
Pauli explained the electron shells, but not the lengths of the periods in the table [Scerri]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord [Jeremiah]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? [Jeremiah]