Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jeremiah, Crawford L. Elder and Allan Gibbard

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22 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
13795 Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
13798 Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
13797 The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
13794 Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder]
13796 Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
7346 Jeremiah implied a link between weakness and goodness, and the evil of the state [Jeremiah, by Johnson,P]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
22920 Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord [Jeremiah]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
22089 Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? [Jeremiah]