124 ideas
| 15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 15586 | When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide [Heidegger] |
| 15582 | Perhaps the aim of philosophy is to abolish sham problems [Heidegger] |
| 2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
| 22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
| 15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
| 6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
| 21953 | For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
| 15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
| 6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
| 6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
| 6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
| 6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
| 15571 | The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger] |
| 6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
| 6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
| 6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
| 2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
| 6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
| 6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
| 6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
| 6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
| 6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
| 21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
| 15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
| 9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
| 22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
| 8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
| 21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
| 20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
| 8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
| 15584 | I say the manifestation of Being needs humans, and humans only exist as reflected in Being [Heidegger] |
| 7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
| 6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
| 6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
| 22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
| 6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
| 22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
| 6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
| 15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 18892 | Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn] |
| 12019 | McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn] |
| 6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
| 6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
| 6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
| 6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
| 6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
| 6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
| 6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
| 6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
| 6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
| 6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
| 6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
| 6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
| 6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
| 6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
| 15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
| 22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
| 22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
| 22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
| 22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
| 22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
| 22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
| 22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
| 22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
| 22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
| 22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
| 22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
| 22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
| 22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
| 22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
| 7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
| 15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
| 20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
| 6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
| 6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
| 22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
| 21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
| 4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
| 2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
| 15579 | My active existence is defined by being able to say 'I can' [Heidegger] |
| 15583 | Certainty that I will die is more basic to my existence than the Cogito [Heidegger] |
| 22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
| 20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
| 2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
| 2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
| 7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
| 2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
| 3185 | Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn] |
| 15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
| 22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
| 22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
| 18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
| 4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
| 6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
| 2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
| 6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
| 22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
| 20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
| 22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
| 22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
| 21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 20767 | Culture is now dominated by boredom, so universal it is unnoticed [Heidegger, by Aho] |
| 15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
| 20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
| 15581 | Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be [Heidegger] |
| 7346 | Jeremiah implied a link between weakness and goodness, and the evil of the state [Jeremiah, by Johnson,P] |
| 2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
| 22920 | Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord [Jeremiah] |
| 6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
| 6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |
| 22089 | Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? [Jeremiah] |