104 ideas
16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
18052 | An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor] |
14718 | An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter] |
467 | A virtue is a combination of intelligence, strength and luck [Ion] |
11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |