129 ideas
22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
6887 | Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner] |
6881 | Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them [Mautner] |
5439 | The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted [Mautner] |
9959 | 'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner] |
9961 | 'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions [Mautner] |
9958 | Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance [Mautner] |
9960 | A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning [Mautner] |
9957 | Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes [Mautner] |
6219 | The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole [Mautner] |
22462 | We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot] |
6888 | Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree [Mautner] |
6877 | Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems [Mautner] |
6880 | Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions [Mautner] |
6879 | 'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q [Mautner] |
6878 | A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience [Mautner] |
6889 | Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner] |
6890 | Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned [Mautner] |
6882 | Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner] |
6886 | Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner] |
6885 | Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner] |
6884 | Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner] |
6883 | Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner] |
5449 | Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner] |
6898 | Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner] |
6452 | 'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume [Mautner] |
22449 | When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot] |
4783 | Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG] |
4782 | 'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [Mautner, by PG] |
22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
2170 | Homer does not distinguish between soul and body [Homer, by Williams,B] |
23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
6899 | The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance [Mautner] |
2171 | The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B] |
23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
22480 | Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot] |
23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
22393 | I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot] |
23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
22481 | There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG] |
22482 | I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot] |
22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
6896 | Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner] |
6897 | Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner] |
4692 | It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot] |
4694 | Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot] |
22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
23683 | Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
22451 | All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot] |
22485 | Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot] |
22474 | Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot] |
23684 | Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23690 | We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
5452 | 'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature [Mautner] |
22477 | Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot] |
22486 | The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot] |
23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
22375 | Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot] |
22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
22378 | We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot] |
22487 | Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot] |
22377 | Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot] |
22376 | Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot] |
22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
22452 | Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot] |
23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |
22381 | Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot] |
21819 | Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus] |
22379 | The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot] |
22458 | Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot] |
22460 | Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot] |
22461 | Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot] |
22464 | The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot] |
22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
22402 | Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot] |
23145 | Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver] |
22401 | Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot] |
22398 | Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot] |
22478 | The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot] |
23692 | Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot] |
22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
22456 | Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot] |
22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
22403 | Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot] |
22472 | The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot] |
22479 | Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot] |
22400 | Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot] |
22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
22395 | Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot] |
22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
22463 | Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot] |
22459 | For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot] |
22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
11388 | Let there be one ruler [Homer] |
4693 | The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot] |
22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |
22380 | Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot] |
14829 | Homer so enjoys the company of the gods that he must have been deeply irreligious [Homer, by Nietzsche] |