63 ideas
11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
20388 | 'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S] |
20389 | A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S] |
11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
20387 | Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S] |
20385 | The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S] |
20386 | The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S] |
20384 | The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S] |
20390 | Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S] |
20392 | 'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S] |
20405 | Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S] |
20403 | It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S] |
20393 | The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S] |
20402 | Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S] |
20395 | The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S] |
20396 | We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S] |
20399 | Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S] |
20401 | The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S] |
20397 | If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S] |
20398 | Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S] |
20404 | Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S] |
22705 | If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S] |
22707 | It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S] |
22706 | A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S] |
22704 | Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |