14 ideas
| 10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
| 10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
| 10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
| 8439 | Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett] |
| 8440 | Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett] |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
| 8441 | Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett] |
| 8436 | Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett] |
| 8435 | Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| 8437 | The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett] |
| 8438 | A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett] |
| 8592 | Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker] |