102 ideas
19579 | The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis] |
19583 | Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis] |
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
19588 | The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis] |
19598 | Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis] |
19586 | Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis] |
19587 | Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis] |
19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
19597 | Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis] |
19581 | A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis] |
19584 | Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis] |
18091 | Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities [Berkeley] |
22025 | Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard] |
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
3942 | I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley] |
3952 | I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley] |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
3959 | There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley] |
16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
3946 | A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley] |
3958 | Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley] |
3943 | If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley] |
3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
1103 | 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley] |
6403 | For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling] |
3936 | Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley] |
3930 | There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley] |
3939 | I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley] |
3945 | There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley] |
3947 | Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley] |
22067 | Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis] |
3933 | Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley] |
6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
3934 | A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley] |
3935 | The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley] |
3937 | 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley] |
3940 | Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley] |
6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
3957 | Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley] |
19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
3953 | Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley] |
3938 | Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley] |
19590 | Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis] |
3944 | It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley] |
3932 | A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley] |
19594 | General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis] |
23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
3948 | Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley] |
6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
19596 | The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis] |
19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
5374 | Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley] |
19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
19585 | Every person has his own language [Novalis] |
19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
3954 | Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley] |
19582 | Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
22027 | Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis] |
19589 | The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis] |
19580 | If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis] |
19593 | Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis] |
19595 | Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis] |
19592 | The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis] |
6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
3950 | There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley] |
3951 | There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley] |
3949 | It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley] |
19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |
6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |
3956 | People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley] |
3955 | If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley] |