Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hesiod, Michael Smith and Mirabeau and committee

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The purpose of society is to protect the rights of liberty, property, security and resistance [Mirabeau/committee]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The law expresses the general will, and all citizens can participate [Mirabeau/committee]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
There is only a constitution if rights are assured, and separation of powers defined [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
No one should be molested for their opinions, if they do not disturb the established order [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Free speech is very precious, and everyone may speak and write freely (but take responsibility for it) [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
All citizens are eligible for roles in the state, purely on the basis of merit [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property is a sacred right, breached only when essential, and with fair compensation [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
Everyone must contribute to the state's power and administration, in just proportion [Mirabeau/committee]