607 ideas
| 9764 | Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy [Quine] |
| 9763 | For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary [Quine] |
| 9438 | Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford] |
| 13736 | Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine] |
| 1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
| 7653 | I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke] |
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 22438 | Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine] |
| 6891 | Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner] |
| 6310 | Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine] |
| 11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
| 8996 | If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine] |
| 22436 | Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine] |
| 16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
| 12526 | Opposition to reason is mad [Locke] |
| 9023 | If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine] |
| 6564 | To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not' [Quine] |
| 22431 | Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine] |
| 8207 | The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases [Quine] |
| 8208 | In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise [Quine] |
| 1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
| 12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke] |
| 16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 19048 | Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences [Quine] |
| 8995 | Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine] |
| 19047 | Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful [Quine] |
| 21699 | Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine] |
| 21697 | The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine] |
| 12573 | Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke] |
| 12491 | Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke] |
| 12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke] |
| 12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke] |
| 12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke] |
| 12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke] |
| 21750 | Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine] |
| 9012 | Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine] |
| 9011 | Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine] |
| 12572 | Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke] |
| 8084 | Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke] |
| 22435 | The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine] |
| 9013 | We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine] |
| 10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
| 5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine] |
| 13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
| 22433 | It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine] |
| 3302 | Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 9879 | NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Quine, by Dummett] |
| 10211 | Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 21717 | Reducibility undermines type ramification, and is committed to the existence of functions [Quine, by Linsky,B] |
| 18170 | The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine] |
| 21695 | The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine] |
| 21693 | Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine] |
| 3336 | Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 9020 | My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine] |
| 13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
| 9028 | Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine] |
| 9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
| 13639 | Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine] |
| 10014 | Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes] |
| 10828 | Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine] |
| 13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
| 12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 22437 | Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine] |
| 10064 | Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave] |
| 10055 | Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke] |
| 20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
| 8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
| 8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
| 9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
| 19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
| 9024 | Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine] |
| 10012 | Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine] |
| 22434 | Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine] |
| 13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
| 1618 | We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine] |
| 12221 | 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine] |
| 21698 | All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine] |
| 8453 | If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine] |
| 10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
| 19321 | We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham] |
| 8455 | Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8456 | Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
| 9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
| 1611 | Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine] |
| 10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
| 10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
| 10311 | No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale] |
| 10538 | Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett] |
| 9015 | Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine] |
| 10793 | Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10801 | Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine] |
| 21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
| 9025 | You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine] |
| 9026 | Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine] |
| 10705 | Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine] |
| 12798 | Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine] |
| 9027 | A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine] |
| 21691 | Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine] |
| 21690 | Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine] |
| 9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
| 21689 | A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine] |
| 21694 | Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine] |
| 21692 | If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine] |
| 16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
| 8994 | If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine] |
| 17905 | Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine] |
| 12488 | The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke] |
| 12489 | If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke] |
| 8997 | There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine] |
| 8463 | Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine] |
| 8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
| 10242 | I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine] |
| 12556 | Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 21696 | Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine] |
| 17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
| 7782 | Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke] |
| 9556 | Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine] |
| 18198 | Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted [Quine] |
| 8993 | If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine] |
| 21557 | Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Quine, by Lackey] |
| 1613 | Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine] |
| 9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
| 1635 | Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine] |
| 1616 | Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine] |
| 1615 | Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine] |
| 8466 | For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8467 | Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 1614 | Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine] |
| 10241 | For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
| 4064 | The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane] |
| 8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke] |
| 12554 | Existences can only be known by experience [Locke] |
| 1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
| 19277 | Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale] |
| 16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |
| 11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
| 8205 | Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time [Quine] |
| 12502 | Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke] |
| 1630 | We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine] |
| 11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
| 16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
| 12210 | Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine] |
| 12568 | God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke] |
| 18438 | Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine] |
| 10243 | My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine] |
| 12516 | Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke] |
| 12517 | Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke] |
| 19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
| 8496 | What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine] |
| 11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 10667 | A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack] |
| 1610 | To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 5747 | "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia] |
| 16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
| 16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
| 16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
| 8459 | Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8497 | An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine] |
| 4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
| 18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
| 18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
| 3325 | For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 16261 | If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine] |
| 7698 | If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine] |
| 19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
| 14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
| 16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |
| 13435 | We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke] |
| 12535 | If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke] |
| 16462 | The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine] |
| 13436 | There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke] |
| 11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
| 8461 | The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine] |
| 8534 | Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong] |
| 7925 | There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine] |
| 10295 | Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 3322 | Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 6078 | Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn] |
| 9017 | Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine] |
| 8479 | Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
| 12477 | We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke] |
| 12490 | Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke] |
| 12521 | We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke] |
| 15974 | The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke] |
| 14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
| 15976 | What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke] |
| 15723 | Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine] |
| 16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
| 15490 | Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB] |
| 16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
| 15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke] |
| 1612 | Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine] |
| 3751 | Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette] |
| 7717 | All things that exist are particulars [Locke] |
| 7718 | Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke] |
| 15402 | There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine] |
| 9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
| 4443 | Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong] |
| 11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
| 8504 | Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt] |
| 7970 | Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C] |
| 18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
| 11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
| 11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
| 7924 | The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine] |
| 1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
| 12499 | Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke] |
| 8498 | Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine] |
| 8464 | Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine] |
| 9018 | A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine] |
| 13387 | Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine] |
| 15783 | Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine] |
| 1211 | Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke] |
| 12508 | Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke] |
| 8277 | I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine] |
| 18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
| 12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke] |
| 12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke] |
| 12529 | I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke] |
| 8546 | Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke] |
| 1196 | We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke] |
| 12536 | We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke] |
| 7945 | We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke] |
| 12485 | We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke] |
| 16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 12507 | A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke] |
| 12559 | Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke] |
| 12498 | Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke] |
| 12520 | The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke] |
| 13771 | Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke] |
| 16038 | Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12810 | We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 16786 | You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke] |
| 15992 | Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke] |
| 15990 | Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke] |
| 12530 | The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke] |
| 12532 | Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke] |
| 12539 | If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke] |
| 12510 | Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke] |
| 11155 | Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke] |
| 12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke] |
| 16787 | Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 16028 | Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12305 | Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15985 | It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke] |
| 12534 | We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke] |
| 10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
| 13434 | In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke] |
| 16035 | If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke] |
| 16036 | Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke] |
| 12540 | Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke] |
| 12812 | Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke] |
| 16031 | Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 15646 | If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle] |
| 12306 | 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi] |
| 15988 | The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke] |
| 15644 | In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke] |
| 12537 | To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke] |
| 16029 | Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12531 | Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke] |
| 13433 | Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke] |
| 12533 | Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke] |
| 12557 | Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke] |
| 12561 | For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke] |
| 12525 | The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke] |
| 13431 | A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke] |
| 13423 | The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke] |
| 12804 | There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12547 | We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke] |
| 10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
| 10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
| 8482 | Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine] |
| 12136 | Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine] |
| 13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
| 12503 | Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke] |
| 9019 | Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine] |
| 12505 | One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke] |
| 17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
| 18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
| 17594 | We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine] |
| 16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke] |
| 12504 | Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke] |
| 18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
| 11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
| 10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
| 14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
| 12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
| 9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
| 9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
| 10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
| 10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
| 4577 | There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine] |
| 8206 | Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine] |
| 8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
| 15782 | Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan] |
| 9014 | Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine] |
| 15725 | Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine] |
| 15722 | Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine] |
| 22432 | Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine] |
| 15719 | We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine] |
| 15721 | Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine] |
| 15724 | Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine] |
| 15720 | What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine] |
| 12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke] |
| 2796 | For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J] |
| 8856 | Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo] |
| 13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
| 12443 | Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine] |
| 9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
| 12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke] |
| 13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
| 12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke] |
| 18969 | How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine] |
| 15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke] |
| 12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke] |
| 15994 | If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke] |
| 12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke] |
| 12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke] |
| 18209 | We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine] |
| 9379 | A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine] |
| 7570 | Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley] |
| 12472 | If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke] |
| 7709 | A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke] |
| 4018 | Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke] |
| 7723 | The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke] |
| 7507 | The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke] |
| 12474 | The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke] |
| 9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
| 9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
| 12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
| 12518 | The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke] |
| 9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
| 9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
| 9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
| 12478 | A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke] |
| 12481 | Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke] |
| 12546 | We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke] |
| 15989 | Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15971 | Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke] |
| 6725 | Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 15982 | Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 12479 | Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke] |
| 12480 | Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke] |
| 7049 | In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15973 | In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 7050 | I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil] |
| 15979 | Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke] |
| 21686 | Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables [Quine] |
| 12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke] |
| 7724 | All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke] |
| 1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
| 8450 | Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 19046 | Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism [Quine] |
| 19049 | In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine] |
| 1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
| 12527 | Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke] |
| 12555 | The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke] |
| 12542 | Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke] |
| 16637 | The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke] |
| 21685 | Empiricism says evidence rests on the senses, but that insight is derived from science [Quine] |
| 19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
| 2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J] |
| 12543 | Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke] |
| 19517 | Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke] |
| 15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke] |
| 2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty] |
| 10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke] |
| 7627 | You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine] |
| 8871 | We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson] |
| 8826 | If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine] |
| 8827 | Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine] |
| 8899 | Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine] |
| 6488 | Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H] |
| 3868 | To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith] |
| 1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
| 16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
| 4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| 21687 | It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience [Quine] |
| 21688 | There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories [Quine] |
| 4713 | For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady] |
| 1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
| 16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
| 16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
| 21748 | More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine] |
| 16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
| 16037 | Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 16032 | To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
| 12519 | Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke] |
| 12551 | We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke] |
| 12483 | Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke] |
| 5002 | Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke] |
| 2603 | If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke] |
| 2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke] |
| 3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke] |
| 7721 | Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke] |
| 12476 | Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke] |
| 12501 | The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke] |
| 9083 | The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke] |
| 7040 | General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke] |
| 16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
| 16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
| 8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
| 16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
| 12528 | If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke] |
| 5512 | Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 1202 | A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke] |
| 1381 | Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke] |
| 1385 | 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke] |
| 1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke] |
| 1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke] |
| 5175 | Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke] |
| 1363 | Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke] |
| 1368 | Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke] |
| 1373 | Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke] |
| 1380 | Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke] |
| 5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke] |
| 1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke] |
| 12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke] |
| 12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke] |
| 12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke] |
| 1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan] |
| 6139 | Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke] |
| 5513 | Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke] |
| 1345 | Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke] |
| 1197 | No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke] |
| 1364 | Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke] |
| 12511 | If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke] |
| 1361 | If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke] |
| 21326 | Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke] |
| 1387 | Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke] |
| 12809 | Nothing about me is essential [Locke] |
| 3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke] |
| 12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke] |
| 12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke] |
| 12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke] |
| 7840 | For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke] |
| 12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke] |
| 15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke] |
| 12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke] |
| 3131 | Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey] |
| 8462 | A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine] |
| 6712 | For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley] |
| 12496 | Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke] |
| 15967 | The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke] |
| 6486 | Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke] |
| 12475 | All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke] |
| 17735 | Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke] |
| 12471 | Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke] |
| 11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
| 5827 | A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke] |
| 11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |
| 1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
| 8898 | Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine] |
| 7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke] |
| 7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke] |
| 22430 | If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine] |
| 21700 | Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine] |
| 21701 | Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine] |
| 1619 | There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine] |
| 7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
| 9009 | Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine] |
| 1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
| 9471 | Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised [Quine] |
| 8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
| 1609 | I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine] |
| 1617 | The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine] |
| 4712 | Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady] |
| 8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke] |
| 15788 | Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Quine, by Lycan] |
| 19159 | Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson] |
| 16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
| 18967 | A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine] |
| 18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
| 9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
| 9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
| 9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
| 9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| 1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
| 9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
| 14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
| 7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
| 8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
| 17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
| 1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |
| 8900 | In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine] |
| 8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |
| 19050 | Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine] |
| 21338 | I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine] |
| 15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke] |
| 9021 | A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine] |
| 19045 | Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability [Quine] |
| 3988 | Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine] |
| 6311 | The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine] |
| 6312 | We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine] |
| 6313 | Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine] |
| 6317 | Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine] |
| 1631 | You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine] |
| 1632 | Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine] |
| 18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
| 6315 | We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine] |
| 6314 | Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine] |
| 7330 | The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A] |
| 4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke] |
| 12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke] |
| 12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke] |
| 12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke] |
| 21749 | Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine] |
| 21751 | Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine] |
| 1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke] |
| 4019 | Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke] |
| 12515 | Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
| 19906 | All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke] |
| 19882 | We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke] |
| 19864 | In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke] |
| 19865 | There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke] |
| 19866 | The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke] |
| 19872 | The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke] |
| 19907 | There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke] |
| 19863 | Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke] |
| 5654 | The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton] |
| 19888 | A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke] |
| 6702 | If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke] |
| 19909 | A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke] |
| 19910 | A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke] |
| 19893 | Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke] |
| 19894 | You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke] |
| 19892 | Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke] |
| 19885 | Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke] |
| 19886 | The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke] |
| 19903 | Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke] |
| 19905 | People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke] |
| 19904 | Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke] |
| 19895 | Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke] |
| 19900 | The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke] |
| 19902 | Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke] |
| 19908 | Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke] |
| 19911 | If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke] |
| 19901 | The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke] |
| 19887 | Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke] |
| 19913 | A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke] |
| 19883 | Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke] |
| 19870 | If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke] |
| 19871 | Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke] |
| 19880 | All value depends on the labour involved [Locke] |
| 19884 | There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke] |
| 19873 | We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke] |
| 6580 | Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin] |
| 20520 | Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke] |
| 19875 | A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke] |
| 19874 | If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke] |
| 19877 | Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke] |
| 19876 | Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke] |
| 19878 | Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke] |
| 12548 | It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke] |
| 19879 | A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke] |
| 19898 | Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke] |
| 19881 | The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke] |
| 19868 | It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke] |
| 19867 | Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke] |
| 19912 | Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke] |
| 19869 | Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke] |
| 19899 | The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke] |
| 15997 | We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke] |
| 15978 | I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke] |
| 7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
| 16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
| 16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
| 15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke] |
| 16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
| 15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke] |
| 12497 | Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke] |
| 10370 | Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Quine, by Schaffer,J] |
| 16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
| 12550 | If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke] |
| 15966 | Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 15984 | The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke] |
| 15950 | We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke] |
| 7713 | We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke] |
| 12545 | Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke] |
| 17862 | Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog] |
| 10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |
| 12484 | Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke] |
| 15986 | Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
| 16685 | An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke] |
| 18970 | The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine] |
| 15980 | We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke] |
| 13713 | Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider] |
| 12486 | An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke] |
| 12487 | We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke] |
| 12567 | It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke] |
| 12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke] |
| 12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke] |
| 12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke] |
| 12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke] |