14 ideas
| 9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
| 18270 | Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa] |
| 9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
| 9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
| 18263 | The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa] |
| 18272 | Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa] |
| 9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
| 9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
| 9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
| 9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
| 18266 | Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
| 18279 | Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa] |
| 9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |