24 ideas
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
7404 | Nations are not obliged to help one-another, but are obliged not to harm one another [Grotius, by Tuck] |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
7402 | Everyone has a right of self-preservation, and harming others is usually unjustifiable [Grotius, by Tuck] |
21938 | Democracy needs respect for individuality, but the 'community of friends' implies strict equality [Grotius] |
19845 | A person is free to renounce their state, as long as it is not a moment of crisis [Grotius, by Rousseau] |
22133 | Grotius and Pufendorf based natural law on real (rather than idealised) humanity [Grotius, by Ford,JD] |
7406 | A natural right of self-preservation is balanced by a natural law to avoid unnecessary harm [Grotius, by Tuck] |
7403 | Grotius ignored elaborate natural law theories, preferring a basic right of self-preservation [Grotius, by Tuck] |
23585 | It is permissible in a just cause to capture a place in neutral territory [Grotius] |
6892 | Moral principles have some validity without a God commanding obedience [Grotius, by Mautner] |