34 ideas
| 23708 | Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG] |
| 23709 | Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
| 16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
| 23707 | Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23714 | Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23711 | A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23712 | Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23698 | Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23699 | 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23700 | A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23701 | A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23702 | A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23703 | Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23704 | We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
| 17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
| 16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
| 16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
| 16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
| 13074 | Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
| 22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 23710 | Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
| 7563 | The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley] |
| 23706 | Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |