187 ideas
| 14519 | It is a great good to show reverence for a wise man [Epicurus] |
| 22733 | Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 14518 | In the study of philosophy, pleasure and knowledge arrive simultaneously [Epicurus] |
| 14052 | Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus] |
| 13291 | Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus] |
| 5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
| 22758 | Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus] |
| 14523 | We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus] |
| 5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
| 22240 | The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus] |
| 7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
| 1484 | We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
| 14027 | If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus] |
| 5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
| 5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
| 2670 | Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 14040 | Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus] |
| 4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
| 21668 | Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 21676 | Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
| 14028 | Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus] |
| 14029 | If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus] |
| 14030 | The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus] |
| 6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
| 14048 | Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus] |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| 14044 | The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus] |
| 14045 | Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus] |
| 14524 | Bodies are combinations of shape, size, resistance and weight [Epicurus] |
| 14046 | A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus] |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| 14047 | Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus] |
| 14039 | Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus] |
| 14050 | We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus] |
| 5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
| 5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| 8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim] |
| 2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
| 1823 | We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
| 2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
| 5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
| 5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
| 1824 | To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14037 | Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus] |
| 5949 | Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
| 2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
| 6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
| 1821 | Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
| 5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
| 4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
| 5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
| 5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
| 1820 | The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
| 1822 | Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
| 4549 | Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus] |
| 2668 | Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 6010 | Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak] |
| 1482 | If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
| 1483 | Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
| 1487 | When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
| 21386 | We should accept as explanations all the plausible ways in which something could come about [Epicurus] |
| 14526 | The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus] |
| 14041 | The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus] |
| 6035 | Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius] |
| 5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
| 5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
| 5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| 5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
| 5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| 5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
| 5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| 5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| 5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
| 5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| 5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
| 6018 | Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley] |
| 20922 | Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
| 14516 | There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus] |
| 14521 | If everything is by necessity, then even denials of necessity are by necessity [Epicurus] |
| 14062 | Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus] |
| 1837 | We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus] |
| 5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| 14042 | The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus] |
| 1909 | How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus] |
| 5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
| 5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
| 5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
| 5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
| 5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
| 5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
| 5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| 1836 | Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus] |
| 14061 | Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus] |
| 6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
| 6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
| 6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
| 6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
| 7814 | It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling] |
| 5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
| 6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
| 23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
| 5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
| 6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
| 6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
| 5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
| 14054 | Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus] |
| 14053 | It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus] |
| 14055 | The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus] |
| 3562 | Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus] |
| 1833 | Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus] |
| 14057 | All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus] |
| 14058 | Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus] |
| 1840 | Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14063 | Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus] |
| 14522 | What happens to me if I obtain all my desires, and what if I fail? [Epicurus] |
| 14059 | The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus] |
| 1835 | True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus] |
| 1839 | Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1842 | Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus] |
| 3557 | The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas] |
| 14056 | We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus] |
| 3563 | Pleasure and virtue entail one another [Epicurus] |
| 1845 | Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus] |
| 3560 | Justice is merely a contract about not harming or being harmed [Epicurus] |
| 14060 | Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus] |
| 1841 | We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 14517 | We value our own character, whatever it is, and we should respect the characters of others [Epicurus] |
| 20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
| 14513 | Justice is a pledge of mutual protection [Epicurus] |
| 1829 | A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1843 | Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus] |
| 14515 | A law is not just if it is not useful in mutual associations [Epicurus] |
| 14520 | It is small-minded to find many good reasons for suicide [Epicurus] |
| 1831 | Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 12044 | Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas] |
| 14032 | Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus] |
| 14033 | Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus] |
| 14034 | There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus] |
| 14035 | Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus] |
| 14038 | There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus] |
| 20907 | Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| 21669 | Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus] |
| 21680 | What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus] |
| 15251 | The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer] |
| 14049 | We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus] |
| 14043 | The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus] |
| 14031 | Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus] |
| 14525 | Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus] |
| 14051 | A cosmos is a collection of stars and an earth, with some sort of boundary, movement and shape [Epicurus] |
| 14036 | There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus] |
| 2637 | For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
| 2633 | Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
| 1828 | God does not intervene in heavenly movements, but is beyond all action and perfectly happy [Epicurus] |
| 2639 | Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
| 5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
| 14527 | If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus] |
| 5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |