26 ideas
23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
4761 | The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |
1472 | The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [Mackie, by PG] |
1473 | Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [Mackie, by PG] |