27 ideas
23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
18776 | Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B] |
21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
18774 | Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B] |
21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |