38 ideas
7807 | The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra] |
9542 | The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell] |
9987 | An aggregate in which order does not matter I call a 'set' [Bolzano] |
21720 | Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead] |
10044 | Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
18208 | We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead] |
8204 | Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead] |
9359 | Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead] |
21707 | Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
10036 | In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
9618 | Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR] |
18248 | A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
10856 | A truly infinite quantity does not need to be a variable [Bolzano] |
18152 | Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock] |
9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
10025 | Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes] |
8683 | Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
10037 | 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead] |
10093 | The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman] |
8691 | The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead] |
10305 | In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead] |
8684 | Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
8746 | To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
17265 | Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
12033 | An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM] |
9185 | Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
10040 | Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
22276 | Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter] |
17264 | Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
12232 | A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano] |
23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |