38 ideas
9247 | Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus] |
6707 | Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus] |
9245 | To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
9244 | Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
9249 | Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus] |
9253 | The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
9250 | Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus] |
9252 | The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus] |
9251 | One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus] |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
6708 | Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus] |
9243 | If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus] |
9242 | Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus] |
9246 | Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus] |
9248 | It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus] |