Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hesiod, Adrian Bardon and Robert Kirk

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40 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon]
The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon]
The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon]
We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon]
The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon]
The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon]
It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon]
We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon]
Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / j. Time travel
At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon]
Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon]