89 ideas
| 18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
| 18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
| 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
| 15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
| 18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
| 18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
| 18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
| 18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
| 18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
| 15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
| 18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
| 18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
| 18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
| 18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
| 18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
| 18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
| 15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
| 18194 | 'Forcing' can produce new models of ZFC from old models [Maddy] |
| 18195 | A Large Cardinal Axiom would assert ever-increasing stages in the hierarchy [Maddy] |
| 13011 | New axioms are being sought, to determine the size of the continuum [Maddy] |
| 13014 | Extensional sets are clearer, simpler, unique and expressive [Maddy] |
| 13013 | The Axiom of Extensionality seems to be analytic [Maddy] |
| 13021 | The Axiom of Infinity states Cantor's breakthrough that launched modern mathematics [Maddy] |
| 13022 | Infinite sets are essential for giving an account of the real numbers [Maddy] |
| 18191 | Axiom of Infinity: completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically [Maddy] |
| 13023 | The Power Set Axiom is needed for, and supported by, accounts of the continuum [Maddy] |
| 18193 | The Axiom of Foundation says every set exists at a level in the set hierarchy [Maddy] |
| 13024 | Efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice have failed [Maddy] |
| 13025 | Modern views say the Choice set exists, even if it can't be constructed [Maddy] |
| 13026 | A large array of theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice [Maddy] |
| 17610 | The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy] |
| 18169 | Axiom of Reducibility: propositional functions are extensionally predicative [Maddy] |
| 13019 | The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy] |
| 13018 | Limitation of Size is a vague intuition that over-large sets may generate paradoxes [Maddy] |
| 17824 | The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy] |
| 8755 | Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
| 10594 | Henkin semantics is more plausible for plural logic than for second-order logic [Maddy] |
| 17620 | Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy] |
| 18168 | 'Propositional functions' are propositions with a variable as subject or predicate [Maddy] |
| 17605 | Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy] |
| 17625 | If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy] |
| 18171 | Cantor and Dedekind brought completed infinities into mathematics [Maddy] |
| 18190 | Completed infinities resulted from giving foundations to calculus [Maddy] |
| 17615 | Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy] |
| 18175 | For any cardinal there is always a larger one (so there is no set of all sets) [Maddy] |
| 18196 | An 'inaccessible' cardinal cannot be reached by union sets or power sets [Maddy] |
| 18172 | Infinity has degrees, and large cardinals are the heart of set theory [Maddy] |
| 18187 | Theorems about limits could only be proved once the real numbers were understood [Maddy] |
| 18182 | The extension of concepts is not important to me [Maddy] |
| 18177 | In the ZFC hierarchy it is impossible to form Frege's set of all three-element sets [Maddy] |
| 18164 | Frege solves the Caesar problem by explicitly defining each number [Maddy] |
| 18163 | Mathematics rests on the logic of proofs, and on the set theoretic axioms [Maddy] |
| 17825 | Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy] |
| 17826 | Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy] |
| 17828 | Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy] |
| 10718 | A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver] |
| 18185 | Unified set theory gives a final court of appeal for mathematics [Maddy] |
| 18183 | Set theory brings mathematics into one arena, where interrelations become clearer [Maddy] |
| 18186 | Identifying geometric points with real numbers revealed the power of set theory [Maddy] |
| 18184 | Making set theory foundational to mathematics leads to very fruitful axioms [Maddy] |
| 18188 | The line of rationals has gaps, but set theory provided an ordered continuum [Maddy] |
| 17618 | Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy] |
| 17827 | Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy] |
| 17830 | Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy] |
| 17823 | If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy] |
| 8756 | Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro] |
| 17733 | We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins] |
| 18204 | Scientists posit as few entities as possible, but set theorist posit as many as possible [Maddy] |
| 18207 | Maybe applications of continuum mathematics are all idealisations [Maddy] |
| 17614 | The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy] |
| 17829 | Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy] |
| 18167 | We can get arithmetic directly from HP; Law V was used to get HP from the definition of number [Maddy] |
| 18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
| 18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
| 18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
| 18205 | The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy] |
| 18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
| 15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
| 15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
| 15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
| 18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
| 15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
| 18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
| 18206 | Science idealises the earth's surface, the oceans, continuities, and liquids [Maddy] |
| 15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |
| 18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |
| 1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |