362 ideas
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
14255 | We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K] |
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
14250 | Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K] |
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
10571 | Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K] |
17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
14259 | Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
19053 | Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett] |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
9560 | S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense [Fine,K] |
18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
18832 | Mathematical statements and entities that result from an infinite process must lack a truth-value [Dummett] |
14263 | Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K] |
10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
9193 | ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett] |
9194 | The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett] |
10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
10565 | There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K] |
13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
10564 | We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K] |
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
9820 | In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
7334 | Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle [Dummett, by Miller,A] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
9195 | Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett] |
12220 | Is it the sentence-token or the sentence-type that has a logical form? [Fine,K] |
11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
19052 | Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett] |
18801 | Classical negation is circular, if it relies on knowing negation-conditions from truth-conditions [Dummett] |
15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
9182 | Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett] |
15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
12222 | Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K] |
10569 | If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K] |
9186 | First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
9187 | Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
10573 | Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K] |
9896 | A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett] |
18255 | Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett] |
9191 | Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett] |
10575 | Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K] |
10574 | Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K] |
9895 | A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett] |
9852 | We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett] |
15938 | Platonists ruin infinity, which is precisely a growing structure which is never completed [Dummett] |
10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
10560 | Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
9829 | The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett] |
9828 | Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett] |
9192 | The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett] |
12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
10568 | Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K] |
9224 | Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K] |
9876 | Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett] |
15939 | For intuitionists it is constructed proofs (which take time) which make statements true [Dummett] |
9222 | The objects and truths of mathematics are imperative procedures for their construction [Fine,K] |
9223 | My Proceduralism has one simple rule, and four complex rules [Fine,K] |
10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
14253 | An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K] |
10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
14262 | Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
14251 | A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K] |
14254 | Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K] |
14257 | An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K] |
14261 | There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K] |
10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
10563 | A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K] |
12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
22297 | Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter] |
9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
15049 | Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
3303 | For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
21628 | To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett] |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
14217 | The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K] |
14216 | The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K] |
14218 | A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K] |
14220 | Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K] |
14219 | Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K] |
16755 | The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau] |
10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
9880 | Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett] |
10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
9885 | The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett] |
10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
9858 | Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett] |
10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
9859 | It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett] |
9860 | 'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett] |
10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
14256 | How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K] |
11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
14258 | Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K] |
11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
9848 | Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett] |
9842 | Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett] |
15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
9212 | Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |
10561 | Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K] |
10562 | We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K] |
10567 | We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
9181 | The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett] |
15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
9836 | Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett] |
8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
18257 | Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |
15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |
8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |