329 ideas
| 21979 | Wisdom emerges at the end of a process [Hegel] |
| 19635 | Hegel produced modern optimism; he failed to grasp that consciousness never progresses [Hegel, by Cioran] |
| 8215 | Hegel was the last philosopher of the Book [Hegel, by Derrida] |
| 20109 | Hegel inserted society and history between the God-world, man-nature, man-being binary pairs [Hegel, by Safranski] |
| 8927 | Philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality [Hegel] |
| 22766 | Philosophy is exploration of the rational [Hegel] |
| 21757 | Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel] |
| 21776 | Philosophy aims to reveal the necessity and rationality of the categories of nature and spirit [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 19073 | True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel] |
| 21753 | If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel] |
| 15624 | Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel] |
| 16011 | Hegel doesn't storm the heavens like the giants, but works his way up by syllogisms [Kierkegaard on Hegel] |
| 15631 | The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel] |
| 15612 | Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel] |
| 5433 | For Hegel, things are incomplete, and contain external references in their own nature [Hegel, by Russell] |
| 21761 | If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21764 | Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21769 | We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel] |
| 21768 | Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel] |
| 22077 | Metaphysics is the lattice which makes incoming material intelligible [Hegel] |
| 3301 | On the continent it is generally believed that metaphysics died with Hegel [Benardete,JA on Hegel] |
| 8935 | Without philosophy, science is barren and futile [Hegel] |
| 21984 | We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel] |
| 22082 | Truth does not appear by asserting reasons and then counter-reasons [Hegel] |
| 7083 | Highest reason is aesthetic, and truth and good are subordinate to beauty [Hegel] |
| 21974 | The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel] |
| 22081 | Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel] |
| 22037 | Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 15626 | Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel] |
| 22768 | Subjective and objective are not firmly opposed, but merge into one another [Hegel] |
| 22035 | The structure of reason is a social and historical achievement [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 8932 | Truth does not come from giving reasons for and against propositions [Hegel] |
| 19661 | Making sufficient reason an absolute devalues the principle of non-contradiction [Hegel, by Meillassoux] |
| 15616 | If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel] |
| 21983 | Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel] |
| 21985 | The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel] |
| 20952 | Rather than in three stages, Hegel presented his dialectic as 'negation of the negation' [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 21766 | Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21767 | Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel] |
| 15638 | Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel] |
| 15639 | Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel] |
| 21978 | Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 15615 | Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel] |
| 18137 | Impredicative definitions are wrong, because they change the set that is being defined? [Bostock] |
| 19070 | Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel] |
| 21793 | Genuine truth is the resolution of the highest contradiction [Hegel] |
| 21795 | What I hold true must also be part of my feelings and character [Hegel] |
| 5644 | In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 19072 | In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel] |
| 19071 | The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel] |
| 7077 | The true is the whole [Hegel] |
| 13439 | Venn Diagrams map three predicates into eight compartments, then look for the conclusion [Bostock] |
| 13421 | 'Disjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no conjunction has a disjunction within its scope [Bostock] |
| 13422 | 'Conjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no disjunction has a conjunction within its scope [Bostock] |
| 13355 | 'Disjunction' says that Γ,φ∨ψ|= iff Γ,φ|= and Γ,ψ|= [Bostock] |
| 13350 | 'Assumptions' says that a formula entails itself (φ|=φ) [Bostock] |
| 13351 | 'Thinning' allows that if premisses entail a conclusion, then adding further premisses makes no difference [Bostock] |
| 13356 | The 'conditional' is that Γ|=φ→ψ iff Γ,φ|=ψ [Bostock] |
| 13352 | 'Cutting' allows that if x is proved, and adding y then proves z, you can go straight to z [Bostock] |
| 13353 | 'Negation' says that Γ,¬φ|= iff Γ|=φ [Bostock] |
| 13354 | 'Conjunction' says that Γ|=φ∧ψ iff Γ|=φ and Γ|=ψ [Bostock] |
| 13610 | A logic with ¬ and → needs three axiom-schemas and one rule as foundation [Bostock] |
| 18122 | Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock] |
| 13846 | A 'free' logic can have empty names, and a 'universally free' logic can have empty domains [Bostock] |
| 18114 | There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock] |
| 18107 | A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock] |
| 18115 | We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock] |
| 18139 | The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock] |
| 18105 | Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock] |
| 18108 | First-order logic is not decidable: there is no test of whether any formula is valid [Bostock] |
| 18109 | The completeness of first-order logic implies its compactness [Bostock] |
| 13346 | Truth is the basic notion in classical logic [Bostock] |
| 13545 | Elementary logic cannot distinguish clearly between the finite and the infinite [Bostock] |
| 13822 | Fictional characters wreck elementary logic, as they have contradictions and no excluded middle [Bostock] |
| 13623 | The syntactic turnstile |- φ means 'there is a proof of φ' or 'φ is a theorem' [Bostock] |
| 13347 | Validity is a conclusion following for premises, even if there is no proof [Bostock] |
| 13348 | It seems more natural to express |= as 'therefore', rather than 'entails' [Bostock] |
| 13349 | Γ|=φ is 'entails'; Γ|= is 'is inconsistent'; |=φ is 'valid' [Bostock] |
| 13617 | MPP is a converse of Deduction: If Γ |- φ→ψ then Γ,φ|-ψ [Bostock] |
| 13614 | MPP: 'If Γ|=φ and Γ|=φ→ψ then Γ|=ψ' (omit Γs for Detachment) [Bostock] |
| 21595 | Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel] |
| 13799 | The sign '=' is a two-place predicate expressing that 'a is the same thing as b' (a=b) [Bostock] |
| 13800 | |= α=α and α=β |= φ(α/ξ ↔ φ(β/ξ) fix identity [Bostock] |
| 13803 | If we are to express that there at least two things, we need identity [Bostock] |
| 13357 | Truth-functors are usually held to be defined by their truth-tables [Bostock] |
| 21777 | Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 13812 | A 'zero-place' function just has a single value, so it is a name [Bostock] |
| 13811 | A 'total' function ranges over the whole domain, a 'partial' function over appropriate inputs [Bostock] |
| 13360 | In logic, a name is just any expression which refers to a particular single object [Bostock] |
| 13361 | An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock] |
| 13813 | Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock] |
| 13814 | Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock] |
| 13816 | Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock] |
| 13817 | Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock] |
| 13848 | We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock] |
| 13815 | Names do not have scope problems (e.g. in placing negation), but Russell's account does have that problem [Bostock] |
| 13438 | 'Prenex normal form' is all quantifiers at the beginning, out of the scope of truth-functors [Bostock] |
| 13818 | If we allow empty domains, we must allow empty names [Bostock] |
| 18123 | Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock] |
| 13801 | An 'informal proof' is in no particular system, and uses obvious steps and some ordinary English [Bostock] |
| 13619 | Quantification adds two axiom-schemas and a new rule [Bostock] |
| 13622 | Axiom systems from Frege, Russell, Church, Lukasiewicz, Tarski, Nicod, Kleene, Quine... [Bostock] |
| 13615 | 'Conditonalised' inferences point to the Deduction Theorem: If Γ,φ|-ψ then Γ|-φ→ψ [Bostock] |
| 13620 | Proof by Assumptions can always be reduced to Proof by Axioms, using the Deduction Theorem [Bostock] |
| 13621 | The Deduction Theorem and Reductio can 'discharge' assumptions - they aren't needed for the new truth [Bostock] |
| 13616 | The Deduction Theorem greatly simplifies the search for proof [Bostock] |
| 18120 | The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of natural deduction [Bostock] |
| 13753 | Natural deduction takes proof from assumptions (with its rules) as basic, and axioms play no part [Bostock] |
| 13755 | Excluded middle is an introduction rule for negation, and ex falso quodlibet will eliminate it [Bostock] |
| 13758 | In natural deduction we work from the premisses and the conclusion, hoping to meet in the middle [Bostock] |
| 13754 | Natural deduction rules for → are the Deduction Theorem (→I) and Modus Ponens (→E) [Bostock] |
| 13757 | Unlike natural deduction, semantic tableaux have recipes for proving things [Bostock] |
| 13611 | Tableau proofs use reduction - seeking an impossible consequence from an assumption [Bostock] |
| 13613 | A completed open branch gives an interpretation which verifies those formulae [Bostock] |
| 13612 | Non-branching rules add lines, and branching rules need a split; a branch with a contradiction is 'closed' [Bostock] |
| 13761 | In a tableau proof no sequence is established until the final branch is closed; hypotheses are explored [Bostock] |
| 13756 | A tree proof becomes too broad if its only rule is Modus Ponens [Bostock] |
| 13762 | Tableau rules are all elimination rules, gradually shortening formulae [Bostock] |
| 13759 | Each line of a sequent calculus is a conclusion of previous lines, each one explicitly recorded [Bostock] |
| 13760 | A sequent calculus is good for comparing proof systems [Bostock] |
| 13364 | Interpretation by assigning objects to names, or assigning them to variables first [Bostock, by PG] |
| 13821 | Extensionality is built into ordinary logic semantics; names have objects, predicates have sets of objects [Bostock] |
| 13362 | If an object has two names, truth is undisturbed if the names are swapped; this is Extensionality [Bostock] |
| 13541 | For 'negation-consistent', there is never |-(S)φ and |-(S)¬φ [Bostock] |
| 13542 | A proof-system is 'absolutely consistent' iff we don't have |-(S)φ for every formula [Bostock] |
| 13540 | A set of formulae is 'inconsistent' when there is no interpretation which can make them all true [Bostock] |
| 13544 | Inconsistency or entailment just from functors and quantifiers is finitely based, if compact [Bostock] |
| 13618 | Compactness means an infinity of sequents on the left will add nothing new [Bostock] |
| 15628 | The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel] |
| 15629 | Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel] |
| 15630 | Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel] |
| 18125 | Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock] |
| 18101 | Each addition changes the ordinality but not the cardinality, prior to aleph-1 [Bostock] |
| 18100 | ω + 1 is a new ordinal, but its cardinality is unchanged [Bostock] |
| 18102 | A cardinal is the earliest ordinal that has that number of predecessors [Bostock] |
| 18106 | Aleph-1 is the first ordinal that exceeds aleph-0 [Bostock] |
| 18095 | Instead of by cuts or series convergence, real numbers could be defined by axioms [Bostock] |
| 18099 | The number of reals is the number of subsets of the natural numbers [Bostock] |
| 18093 | For Eudoxus cuts in rationals are unique, but not every cut makes a real number [Bostock] |
| 18110 | Infinitesimals are not actually contradictory, because they can be non-standard real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18156 | Modern axioms of geometry do not need the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18097 | The Peano Axioms describe a unique structure [Bostock] |
| 13358 | Ordinary or mathematical induction assumes for the first, then always for the next, and hence for all [Bostock] |
| 13359 | Complete induction assumes for all numbers less than n, then also for n, and hence for all numbers [Bostock] |
| 18148 | Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock] |
| 18145 | Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock] |
| 18149 | There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock] |
| 18143 | Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock] |
| 18116 | Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock] |
| 18117 | Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock] |
| 18141 | Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock] |
| 18157 | Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock] |
| 18150 | Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 18158 | Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock] |
| 18127 | Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock] |
| 18144 | Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock] |
| 18147 | Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock] |
| 18146 | If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock] |
| 18129 | Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock] |
| 18111 | Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock] |
| 18159 | Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock] |
| 18155 | A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock] |
| 18140 | The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock] |
| 18138 | Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock] |
| 18131 | If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock] |
| 18134 | Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock] |
| 18135 | If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock] |
| 18136 | If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock] |
| 18133 | The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock] |
| 18132 | The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock] |
| 5645 | The dialectical opposition of being and nothing is resolved in passing to the concept of becoming [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 21762 | To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21977 | Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel] |
| 21760 | Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22772 | Personality overcomes subjective limitations and posits Dasein as its own [Hegel] |
| 5646 | Hegel gives an ontological proof of the existence of everything [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 21765 | The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22059 | Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 22083 | Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22078 | Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel] |
| 15634 | Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel] |
| 21755 | For Hegel, categories shift their form in the course of history [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21754 | Our concepts and categories disclose the world, because we are part of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22079 | Hegel said Kant's fixed categories actually vary with culture and era [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22080 | The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel] |
| 13802 | Relations can be one-many (at most one on the left) or many-one (at most one on the right) [Bostock] |
| 13543 | A relation is not reflexive, just because it is transitive and symmetrical [Bostock] |
| 21981 | The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel] |
| 15637 | Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel] |
| 15613 | Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel] |
| 13847 | If non-existent things are self-identical, they are just one thing - so call it the 'null object' [Bostock] |
| 13820 | The idea that anything which can be proved is necessary has a problem with empty names [Bostock] |
| 21772 | In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel] |
| 15611 | I develop philosophical science from the simplest appearance of immediate consciousness [Hegel, by Hegel] |
| 15636 | The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel] |
| 20954 | The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 8928 | The Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, but felt and intuited [Hegel] |
| 8929 | In the Absolute everything is the same [Hegel] |
| 21774 | Genuine idealism is seeing the ideal structure of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21972 | Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 22038 | Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 22044 | Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel] |
| 21464 | The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner] |
| 22084 | Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel] |
| 21975 | The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel] |
| 21976 | The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 8934 | Being is Thought [Hegel] |
| 22300 | Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel] |
| 9225 | Hegel reputedly claimed to know a priori that there are five planets [Hegel, by Field,H] |
| 15609 | The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel] |
| 21773 | Experience is immediacy, unity, forces, self-awareness, reason, culture, absolute being [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22033 | Hegel tried to avoid Kant's dualism of neutral intuitions and imposed concepts [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 15625 | Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel] |
| 15619 | Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel] |
| 15620 | Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel] |
| 15622 | Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel] |
| 15621 | Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel] |
| 15632 | The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel] |
| 21771 | Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being [Hegel] |
| 22058 | Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 15623 | Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel] |
| 22780 | It is a rejection of intellectual dignity to say that we cannot know the truth [Hegel] |
| 20741 | Consciousness is shaped dialectically, by opposing forces and concepts [Hegel, by Aho] |
| 21770 | Consciousness is both of objects, and of itself [Hegel] |
| 5647 | Hegel claims knowledge of self presupposes desire, and hence objects [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 22770 | A person is a being which is aware of its own self-directed and free subjectivity [Hegel] |
| 5648 | For Hegel knowledge of self presupposes objects, and also a public and moral social world [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 22788 | A human only become a somebody as a member of a social estate [Hegel] |
| 22792 | Individuals attain their right by discovering their self-consciousness in institutions [Hegel] |
| 21780 | A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22040 | Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel] |
| 15617 | In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel] |
| 22039 | Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 15608 | The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel] |
| 21986 | Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 20953 | Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 15607 | We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel] |
| 15610 | Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel] |
| 13363 | A (modern) predicate is the result of leaving a gap for the name in a sentence [Bostock] |
| 21763 | When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 18121 | In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock] |
| 22769 | The concept of the will is the free will which wills its freedom [Hegel] |
| 21787 | Evil enters a good will when we believe we are doing right, but allow no criticism of our choice [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 18549 | Nineteenth century aesthetics focused on art rather than nature (thanks to Hegel) [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 22043 | Hegel largely ignores aesthetic pleasure, taste and beauty, and focuses on the meaning of artworks [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 22042 | Natural beauty is unimportant, because it doesn't show human freedom [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 20413 | For Hegel the importance of art concerns the culture, not the individual [Hegel, by Eldridge] |
| 20394 | The purpose of art is to reveal to Spirit its own nature [Hegel, by Davies,S] |
| 21794 | The main purpose of art is to express the unity of human life [Hegel] |
| 20415 | Art forms a bridge between the sensuous world and the world of pure thought [Hegel] |
| 21786 | Conscience is the right of the self to know what is right and obligatory, and thus make them true [Hegel] |
| 21796 | Man is God if he raises himself, by denying his nature and finitude [Hegel] |
| 22784 | Love is ethical life in its natural form [Hegel] |
| 23274 | World history has no room for happiness [Hegel] |
| 8029 | You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre] |
| 22771 | Be a person, and respect other persons [Hegel] |
| 22051 | The categorical imperative lacks roots in a historical culture [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 22781 | The categorical imperative is fine if you already have a set of moral principles [Hegel] |
| 22779 | The good is realised freedom [Hegel] |
| 21758 | Humans have no fixed identity, but produce and reveal their shifting identity in history [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 8930 | The in-itself must become for-itself, which requires self-consciousness [Hegel] |
| 23275 | The state of nature is one of untamed brutality [Hegel] |
| 20414 | Hegel's Absolute Spirit is the union of human rational activity at a moment, and whatever that sustains [Hegel, by Eldridge] |
| 22787 | The family is the first basis of the state, but estates are a necessary second [Hegel] |
| 23276 | The soul of the people is an organisation of its members which produces an essential unity [Hegel] |
| 22790 | We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel] |
| 21785 | We are only free, with rights, if we claim our freedom, and there are no natural rights [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22767 | I aim to portray the state as a rational entity [Hegel] |
| 22789 | Society draws people, and requires their work, making them wholly dependent on it [Hegel] |
| 22791 | The state is the march of God in the world [Hegel] |
| 3909 | Society isn’t founded on a contract, since contracts presuppose a society [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 22778 | Individuals can't leave the state, because they are natural citizens, and humans require a state [Hegel] |
| 22794 | A fully developed state is conscious and knows what it wills [Hegel] |
| 22799 | The people do not have the ability to know the general will [Hegel] |
| 22801 | The great man of the ages is the one who reveals and accomplishes the will of his time [Hegel] |
| 22796 | A constitution embodies a nation's rights and condition [Hegel] |
| 22777 | Individuals must dedicate themselves to the ethical whole, and give their lives when asked [Hegel] |
| 21791 | Social groups must focus on the state, which must in turn respect their inclusion and their will [Hegel] |
| 22795 | People can achieve respect for their state by insight into its essence [Hegel] |
| 21756 | All revolutions result from spirit changing its categories, to achieve a deeper understanding [Hegel] |
| 21988 | In the 1840s Hegel seemed to defend society being right as it is, as a manifestation of Mind [Hegel, by Singer] |
| 22800 | Majority rule means obligations can be imposed on me [Hegel] |
| 21792 | The state should reflect all interests, and not just popular will, or a popular party [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22041 | Representatives by region ignores whether they care about the national interest [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 22797 | In modern states an individual's actions should be their choice [Hegel] |
| 23272 | The human race matters, and individuals have little importance [Hegel] |
| 22034 | Modern life needs individuality, but must recognise that human agency is social [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 21790 | Moral individuals become ethical when they see the social aspect of a matter [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 8030 | For Hegel, the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community [Hegel, by MacIntyre] |
| 8936 | Human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds [Hegel] |
| 22785 | Even educated women are unsuited to science, philosophy, art and government [Hegel] |
| 23273 | In a good state the goal of the citizens and of the whole state are united [Hegel] |
| 21789 | Slaves have no duties because they have no rights [Hegel] |
| 22776 | Slaves are partly responsible for their own condition [Hegel] |
| 21783 | State slavery is a phase of education, moving towards a full culture [Hegel] |
| 21784 | Slavery is unjust, because humanity is essentially free [Hegel] |
| 21778 | True liberal freedom is to pursue something, while being free to cease the pursuit [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21779 | People assume they are free, but the options available are not under their control [Hegel] |
| 23271 | The goal of the world is Spirit's consciousness and enactment of freedom [Hegel] |
| 22085 | Freedom requires us to submit to a family, or a corporation, or a state [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22798 | Money is the best way to achieve just equality [Hegel] |
| 22783 | Rights imply duties, and duties imply rights [Hegel] |
| 21781 | The absolute right is the right to have rights [Hegel] |
| 21782 | Man has an absolute right to appropriate things [Hegel] |
| 22773 | Because only human beings can own property, everything else can become our property [Hegel] |
| 22774 | A community does not have the property-owning rights that a person has [Hegel] |
| 22775 | The owner of a thing is obviously the first person to freely take possession of it [Hegel] |
| 22802 | Wars add strength to a nation, and cure internal dissension [Hegel] |
| 22786 | Children need discipline, to break their self-will and eradicate sensuousness [Hegel] |
| 21987 | History is the progress of the consciousness of freedom [Hegel] |
| 23270 | We should all agree that there is reason in history [Hegel] |
| 4347 | When man wills the natural, it is no longer natural [Hegel] |
| 15614 | Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel] |
| 8931 | The movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific method [Hegel] |
| 8933 | Science confronts the inner necessities of objects [Hegel] |
| 15635 | The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel] |
| 21980 | God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel] |
| 15618 | If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel] |
| 21775 | The God of revealed religion can only be understood through pure speculative knowledge [Hegel] |
| 15633 | We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel] |
| 4188 | Hegel's entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof [Schopenhauer on Hegel] |
| 6917 | God is the essence of thought, abstracted from the thinker [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |
| 6915 | Hegel made the last attempt to restore Christianity, which philosophy had destroyed [Hegel, by Feuerbach] |
| 6686 | Hegel said he was offering an encyclopaedic rationalisation of Christianity [Hegel, by Graham] |
| 21798 | To universalise 'give everything to the poor' leads to absurdity [Hegel] |
| 22782 | To have pagan beliefs and be a pagan are quite different [Hegel] |
| 22793 | Some religions lead to harsh servitude and the debasement of human beings [Hegel] |
| 21797 | Immortality does not come at a later time, but when pure knowing Spirit fully grasps the universal [Hegel] |
| 1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |