Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Brian Davies and Adolph Rami

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35 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
10938 The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
10940 An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
10939 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
10934 Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
10933 Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
10932 If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
20712 God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
20701 Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
20702 The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
20703 How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
20694 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
20706 A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
20707 The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
20708 If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / d. Religious Experience
20710 Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B]
20711 A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B]
20709 The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / b. Religious Meaning
20697 One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
1513 The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
20699 Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B]