Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Alvin I. Goldman and James Pryor

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23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
4262 If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
4045 Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
4044 Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
4048 Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
4043 Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
4049 The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
4047 Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8830 A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman]
6871 We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
6872 Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
6874 Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
8832 If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8845 An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8842 The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8843 Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
8844 Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
8846 Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
6873 Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8829 Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman]
6875 Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
8847 Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
8831 Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
1513 The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]