Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Alexander Bird and Charles Sanders Peirce

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216 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition [Bird]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce]
Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird]
A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening [Bird]
Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it [Bird]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce]
Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge [Bird]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases [Bird]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start? [Bird]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena [Bird]
There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing [Bird]
Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity [Bird]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant [Bird]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law [Bird]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird]
Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird]
Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird]
We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird]
We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found [Bird]
Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely [Bird]
An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce]
Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce]
Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world [Bird]
Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science [Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Natural kinds are those that we use in induction [Bird]
Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours [Bird]
Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope [Bird]
Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another [Bird]
Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird]
Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird]
Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird]
Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird]
Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations [Bird]
Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working [Bird]
Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter [Bird]
Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird]
The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce]
Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce]
There may be many laws, each with only a few instances [Bird]
'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not [Bird]
There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental [Bird]
A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily [Bird]
If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily [Bird]
Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay? [Bird]
Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself [Bird]
Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird]
We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together [Bird]
If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities. [Bird]
Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual [Bird]
That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird]
Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong [Bird]
With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird]
If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy [Bird]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]