Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Alan Musgrave and Francesco Orsi

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10061 The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave]
10065 Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10050 A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave]
10049 Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
10058 No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
10063 Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave]
10062 Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10060 Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
1513 The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]