Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Vann McGee and Paul Horwich

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


32 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]