18 ideas
22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |