Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, James Pryor and John Etchemendy

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


11 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Etchemendy says fix the situation and vary the interpretation, or fix interpretations with varying situations [Etchemendy, by Read]
Validity is where either the situation or the interpretation blocks true premises and false conclusion [Etchemendy, by Read]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]