Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Iris Murdoch and Dorothy Edgington

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
We know perfection when we see what is imperfect [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
We should first decide what are the great works of art, with aesthetic theory following from that [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Great art proves the absurdity of art for art's sake [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Art and morals are essentially the same, and are both identical with love [Murdoch]
Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch]
Because art is love, it improves us morally [Murdoch]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch]
Love is realising something other than oneself is real [Murdoch]
Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch]
It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch]
Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Man is a brave naked will, separate from a background of values and realities [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch]
Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch]