87 ideas
12330 | In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou] |
9808 | Philosophy aims to reveal the grandeur of mathematics [Badiou] |
12318 | The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou] |
18835 | Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt] |
12325 | Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou] |
12324 | Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou] |
18819 | The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt] |
18826 | 'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt] |
18803 | Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt] |
12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
18814 | 'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt] |
18798 | It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt] |
18799 | Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt] |
18830 | Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt] |
12337 | There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou] |
18843 | The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt] |
18836 | A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt] |
18837 | A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt] |
18845 | If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt] |
12321 | The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou] |
18815 | Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
12342 | Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
18805 | Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt] |
18804 | The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
18827 | If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
18813 | Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt] |
18808 | Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt] |
12341 | Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou] |
18840 | When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt] |
12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
18802 | In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt] |
12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
18800 | Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt] |
18809 | Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt] |
18807 | Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt] |
9812 | In mathematics, if a problem can be formulated, it will eventually be solved [Badiou] |
12335 | Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou] |
12334 | There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou] |
12333 | Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou] |
12322 | Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou] |
18842 | Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt] |
17462 | A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt] |
9813 | Mathematics shows that thinking is not confined to the finite [Badiou] |
12327 | The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou] |
18834 | Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt] |
18846 | Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt] |
17461 | Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt] |
12329 | If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou] |
12328 | Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou] |
12331 | Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou] |
9809 | Mathematics inscribes being as such [Badiou] |
12340 | There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou] |
12323 | Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou] |
12332 | The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou] |
12326 | The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou] |
9811 | It is of the essence of being to appear [Badiou] |
12320 | Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
18839 | An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt] |
18838 | The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt] |
14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
18816 | Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt] |
12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
18825 | S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt] |
18824 | Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt] |
18828 | If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt] |
12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
18821 | Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt] |
18831 | Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt] |
18820 | In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt] |
18817 | We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt] |
18829 | The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
12338 | We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou] |
9814 | All great poetry is engaged in rivalry with mathematics [Badiou] |
12316 | For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
12317 | The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou] |