34 ideas
| 9240 | Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt] |
| 19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
| 19261 | Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig] |
| 19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
| 19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
| 19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
| 19730 | Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig] |
| 19731 | If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig] |
| 19732 | The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig] |
| 19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
| 19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 9228 | Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt] |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
| 9238 | Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt] |
| 9232 | It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt] |
| 9234 | If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt] |
| 9233 | Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt] |
| 9229 | What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt] |
| 9235 | Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt] |
| 9237 | The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt] |
| 9239 | I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt] |
| 9236 | Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt] |
| 9227 | We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt] |
| 9230 | People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt] |
| 9241 | Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt] |
| 9300 | Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt] |
| 9231 | Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt] |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |