Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, H.H. Price and Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J

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26 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
14329 Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9032 Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH]
9034 There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH]
9035 If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH]
9036 There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH]
9037 Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
9033 Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
10645 We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9030 Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH]
9029 If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
10646 Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH]
9031 The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH]
10644 A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
6005 Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]