28 ideas
22140 | The greatest philosophers are methodical; it is what makes them great [Grice] |
14329 | Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH] |
13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
10990 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read] |
14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |
9032 | Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH] |
9035 | If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH] |
9034 | There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH] |
9036 | There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH] |
9037 | Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH] |
9033 | Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH] |
10645 | We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH] |
9030 | Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH] |
9029 | If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH] |
10644 | A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH] |
10646 | Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH] |
9031 | The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH] |
7751 | Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice] |
7752 | Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice] |
7753 | We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice] |
22330 | Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock] |
18045 | Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor] |
18044 | Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor] |
10991 | Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read] |
18046 | Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |