71 ideas
21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
16415 | Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber] |
16413 | Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber] |
21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
10001 | An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber] |
21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
16416 | The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber] |
21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
10007 | Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
9998 | What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber] |
10002 | '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber] |
21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
10003 | Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber] |
10008 | Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber] |
10005 | Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber] |
10000 | We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber] |
21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
10006 | First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber] |
21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
10004 | Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |