155 ideas
| 15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 15586 | When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide [Heidegger] |
| 15582 | Perhaps the aim of philosophy is to abolish sham problems [Heidegger] |
| 12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
| 13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis] |
| 5486 | Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis] |
| 22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
| 15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 21953 | For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis] |
| 12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
| 15571 | The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger] |
| 13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis] |
| 12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
| 21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
| 15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
| 9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
| 22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
| 8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
| 21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
| 20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
| 8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
| 15584 | I say the manifestation of Being needs humans, and humans only exist as reflected in Being [Heidegger] |
| 7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
| 12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
| 12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
| 22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
| 13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis] |
| 5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG] |
| 13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis] |
| 12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
| 13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis] |
| 9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis] |
| 5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis] |
| 12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
| 12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
| 12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
| 13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis] |
| 12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
| 5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis] |
| 18398 | Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis] |
| 13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis] |
| 13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis] |
| 12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
| 13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis] |
| 13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis] |
| 5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis] |
| 23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
| 13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis] |
| 5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis] |
| 13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
| 13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
| 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| 13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis] |
| 13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis] |
| 12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
| 15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 5443 | Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable [Ellis] |
| 5444 | 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis] |
| 13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis] |
| 12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
| 5462 | Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate [Ellis] |
| 5448 | 'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis] |
| 13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis] |
| 5477 | One thing can look like something else, without being the something else [Ellis] |
| 13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis] |
| 12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
| 5479 | Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
| 12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
| 5483 | Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis] |
| 13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis] |
| 5447 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis] |
| 5476 | Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis] |
| 5478 | Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis] |
| 5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis] |
| 15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
| 22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
| 5453 | Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction [Ellis] |
| 5466 | Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass [Ellis] |
| 15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
| 20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
| 22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
| 12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
| 13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis] |
| 5485 | Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis] |
| 13597 | Good explanations unify [Ellis] |
| 5484 | Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis] |
| 13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis] |
| 13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis] |
| 21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
| 13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis] |
| 15579 | My active existence is defined by being able to say 'I can' [Heidegger] |
| 15583 | Certainty that I will die is more basic to my existence than the Cogito [Heidegger] |
| 22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
| 20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
| 15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 5457 | Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [Ellis, by PG] |
| 5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis] |
| 5489 | Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions [Ellis] |
| 5490 | Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right [Ellis] |
| 20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
| 22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
| 22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
| 21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 20767 | Culture is now dominated by boredom, so universal it is unnoticed [Heidegger, by Aho] |
| 15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
| 20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
| 15581 | Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be [Heidegger] |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| 5472 | Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures [Ellis] |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
| 12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
| 13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis] |
| 12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
| 13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis] |
| 5471 | Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws [Ellis] |
| 5446 | For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical [Ellis] |
| 5480 | The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws [Ellis] |
| 13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis] |
| 5445 | Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis] |
| 5463 | Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis] |
| 5491 | A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis] |
| 13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis] |
| 5442 | For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside [Ellis] |
| 5473 | The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds [Ellis] |
| 5474 | Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances [Ellis] |
| 5475 | We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws [Ellis] |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
| 12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
| 5460 | Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once [Ellis] |
| 13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis] |
| 13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis] |
| 13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis] |
| 13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis] |
| 5459 | Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws [Ellis] |
| 5461 | The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell [Ellis] |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
| 13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
| 5464 | For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis] |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
| 5487 | Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology [Ellis] |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| 12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
| 12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
| 12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
| 12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |