Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Antonio Gramsci and Wilson,G/Schpall,S

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23 ideas

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state should produce higher civilisations for all, in tune with the economic apparatus [Gramsci]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
Eventually political parties lose touch with the class they represent, which is dangerous [Gramsci]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Caesarism emerges when two forces in society are paralysed in conflict [Gramsci]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Totalitarian parties cut their members off from other cultural organisations [Gramsci]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
What is the function of a parliament? Does it even constitute a part of the State structure? [Gramsci]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberalism's weakness is its powerful rigid bureaucracy [Gramsci]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Perfect political equality requires economic equality [Gramsci]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]