Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, A Clark / D Chalmers and Karl Popper

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22 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22358 Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
11946 Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12177 Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
5451 Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
19743 A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22188 Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
18284 Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
7780 Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
16830 We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
6794 If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
6795 When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
3856 Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
7779 There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
3860 Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
12176 Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
6176 A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands]
19741 If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers]
19742 Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
19744 If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
6005 Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12175 Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
12179 Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]