149 ideas
421 | Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed [Heraclitus] |
1491 | Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking [Heraclitus] |
9408 | Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford] |
5863 | Reason is eternal, but men are foolish [Heraclitus] |
9429 | Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford] |
414 | Logos is common to all, but most people live as if they have a private understanding [Heraclitus] |
416 | Beautiful harmony comes from things that are in opposition to one another [Heraclitus] |
425 | A thing can have opposing tensions but be in harmony, like a lyre [Heraclitus] |
15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
1312 | If everything is and isn't then everything is true, and a midway between true and false makes everything false [Aristotle on Heraclitus] |
7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
9427 | For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford] |
6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan] |
14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
14333 | Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford] |
14336 | Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford] |
14315 | Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford] |
14332 | There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford] |
14302 | A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford] |
14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
9446 | Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford] |
14316 | If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford] |
14310 | Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford] |
14317 | I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford] |
15658 | The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus] |
14313 | All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford] |
14318 | Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford] |
14298 | Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford] |
14293 | Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford] |
14326 | Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford] |
14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
14312 | Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford] |
14291 | Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford] |
14299 | There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford] |
14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
9435 | A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford] |
9447 | If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford] |
15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
13782 | Everything gives way, and nothing stands fast [Heraclitus] |
18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
11853 | A mixed drink separates if it is not stirred [Heraclitus] |
14295 | Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford] |
12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
11091 | You can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stage [Quine on Heraclitus] |
427 | It is not possible to step twice into the same river [Heraclitus] |
2064 | If flux is continuous, then lack of change can't be a property, so everything changes in every possible way [Plato on Heraclitus] |
5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan] |
18618 | Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford] |
18619 | Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford] |
18620 | Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford] |
14309 | Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford] |
14311 | Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford] |
15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |
15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
430 | Senses are no use if the soul is corrupt [Heraclitus] |
1500 | When we sleep, reason closes down as the senses do [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
417 | Donkeys prefer chaff to gold [Heraclitus] |
426 | Sea water is life-giving for fish, but not for people [Heraclitus] |
431 | Health, feeding and rest are only made good by disease, hunger and weariness [Heraclitus] |
14319 | Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford] |
14342 | General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford] |
14322 | If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford] |
14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
14324 | Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford] |
6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |
6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan] |
6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |
429 | To God (though not to humans) all things are beautiful and good and just [Heraclitus] |
12294 | Good and evil are the same thing [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
419 | If one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since nothing leads to it [Heraclitus] |
415 | If happiness is bodily pleasure, then oxen are happy when they have vetch to eat [Heraclitus] |
5155 | It is hard to fight against emotion, but harder still to fight against pleasure [Heraclitus] |
433 | For man character is destiny [Heraclitus] |
422 | The people should fight for the law as if for their city-wall [Heraclitus] |
6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan] |
614 | Heraclitus said sometimes everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
424 | Reason tells us that all things are one [Heraclitus] |
5096 | Heraclitus says that at some time everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
17539 | The sayings of Heraclitus are still correct, if we replace 'fire' with 'energy' [Heraclitus, by Heisenberg] |
3054 | Heraclitus said fire could be transformed to create the other lower elements [Heraclitus, by Diog. Laertius] |
15660 | Logos is the source of everything, and my theories separate and explain each nature [Heraclitus] |
14344 | Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford] |
19068 | Causation interests us because we want to explain change [Mumford] |
9430 | Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford] |
9445 | We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford] |
9443 | It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford] |
14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
9444 | There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford] |
14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
9441 | Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford] |
14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
9431 | Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford] |
9416 | Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford] |
9415 | Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford] |
9422 | If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford] |
9421 | The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford] |
9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
9434 | Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford] |
14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
9437 | To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford] |
9439 | The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford] |
9412 | You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford] |
9411 | There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford] |
12269 | All things are in a state of motion [Heraclitus, by Aristotle] |
6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |
420 | The cosmos is eternal not created, and is an ever-living and changing fire [Heraclitus] |
1499 | Heraclitus says intelligence draws on divine reason [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
15659 | Purifying yourself with blood is as crazy as using mud to wash off mud [Heraclitus] |
1501 | In their ignorance people pray to statues, which is like talking to a house [Heraclitus] |