Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Heraclitus, Ofra Magidor and James Gordon Finlayson

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90 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed [Heraclitus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking [Heraclitus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Reason is eternal, but men are foolish [Heraclitus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Logos is common to all, but most people live as if they have a private understanding [Heraclitus]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Beautiful harmony comes from things that are in opposition to one another [Heraclitus]
A thing can have opposing tensions but be in harmony, like a lyre [Heraclitus]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor]
Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / b. Category mistake as syntactic
Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor]
Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor]
Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor]
The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor]
If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor]
If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor]
Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor]
A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor]
Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor]
If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / d. Category mistake as pragmatic
Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor]
Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor]
Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor]
In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor]
'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / e. Category mistake as ontological
The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
If everything is and isn't then everything is true, and a midway between true and false makes everything false [Aristotle on Heraclitus]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Everything gives way, and nothing stands fast [Heraclitus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
A mixed drink separates if it is not stirred [Heraclitus]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
It is not possible to step twice into the same river [Heraclitus]
You can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stage [Quine on Heraclitus]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
If flux is continuous, then lack of change can't be a property, so everything changes in every possible way [Plato on Heraclitus]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Senses are no use if the soul is corrupt [Heraclitus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
When we sleep, reason closes down as the senses do [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Donkeys prefer chaff to gold [Heraclitus]
Sea water is life-giving for fish, but not for people [Heraclitus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Health, feeding and rest are only made good by disease, hunger and weariness [Heraclitus]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor]
'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor]
Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor]
Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor]
In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor]
The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / c. Presupposition
A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor]
A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor]
The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor]
If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor]
Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor]
Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor]
The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor]
Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor]
Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor]
Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor]
Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor]
Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
To God (though not to humans) all things are beautiful and good and just [Heraclitus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Good and evil are the same thing [Heraclitus, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
We don't condemn people for being bad at reasoning [Finlayson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
If one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since nothing leads to it [Heraclitus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
If happiness is bodily pleasure, then oxen are happy when they have vetch to eat [Heraclitus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
It is hard to fight against emotion, but harder still to fight against pleasure [Heraclitus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
For man character is destiny [Heraclitus]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The 'culture industry' is an advertisement for the way things are [Finlayson]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
The people should fight for the law as if for their city-wall [Heraclitus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Heraclitus said sometimes everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Reason tells us that all things are one [Heraclitus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Heraclitus says that at some time everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle]
The sayings of Heraclitus are still correct, if we replace 'fire' with 'energy' [Heraclitus, by Heisenberg]
Heraclitus said fire could be transformed to create the other lower elements [Heraclitus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Logos is the source of everything, and my theories separate and explain each nature [Heraclitus]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
All things are in a state of motion [Heraclitus, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
The cosmos is eternal not created, and is an ever-living and changing fire [Heraclitus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Heraclitus says intelligence draws on divine reason [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Purifying yourself with blood is as crazy as using mud to wash off mud [Heraclitus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
In their ignorance people pray to statues, which is like talking to a house [Heraclitus]