Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Heraclitus, Gottlob Schulze and Leon Horsten

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87 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Men who love wisdom must be inquirers into very many things indeed [Heraclitus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking [Heraclitus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Reason is eternal, but men are foolish [Heraclitus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Logos is common to all, but most people live as if they have a private understanding [Heraclitus]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Beautiful harmony comes from things that are in opposition to one another [Heraclitus]
A thing can have opposing tensions but be in harmony, like a lyre [Heraclitus]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten]
Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten]
Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten]
'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten]
A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten]
The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten]
Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten]
By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten]
Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten]
An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten]
Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten]
Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten]
This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten]
Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten]
Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics
Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
If everything is and isn't then everything is true, and a midway between true and false makes everything false [Aristotle on Heraclitus]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten]
ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten]
Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Consciousness is not entirely representational, because there are pains, and the self [Schulze, by Pinkard]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten]
If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Everything gives way, and nothing stands fast [Heraclitus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
A mixed drink separates if it is not stirred [Heraclitus]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
It is not possible to step twice into the same river [Heraclitus]
You can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stage [Quine on Heraclitus]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
If flux is continuous, then lack of change can't be a property, so everything changes in every possible way [Plato on Heraclitus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Senses are no use if the soul is corrupt [Heraclitus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
When we sleep, reason closes down as the senses do [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Donkeys prefer chaff to gold [Heraclitus]
Sea water is life-giving for fish, but not for people [Heraclitus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Health, feeding and rest are only made good by disease, hunger and weariness [Heraclitus]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
To God (though not to humans) all things are beautiful and good and just [Heraclitus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Good and evil are the same thing [Heraclitus, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
If one does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since nothing leads to it [Heraclitus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
If happiness is bodily pleasure, then oxen are happy when they have vetch to eat [Heraclitus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
It is hard to fight against emotion, but harder still to fight against pleasure [Heraclitus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
For man character is destiny [Heraclitus]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
The people should fight for the law as if for their city-wall [Heraclitus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Heraclitus said sometimes everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Reason tells us that all things are one [Heraclitus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Heraclitus says that at some time everything becomes fire [Heraclitus, by Aristotle]
The sayings of Heraclitus are still correct, if we replace 'fire' with 'energy' [Heraclitus, by Heisenberg]
Heraclitus said fire could be transformed to create the other lower elements [Heraclitus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Logos is the source of everything, and my theories separate and explain each nature [Heraclitus]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
All things are in a state of motion [Heraclitus, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
The cosmos is eternal not created, and is an ever-living and changing fire [Heraclitus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Heraclitus says intelligence draws on divine reason [Heraclitus, by Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Purifying yourself with blood is as crazy as using mud to wash off mud [Heraclitus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
In their ignorance people pray to statues, which is like talking to a house [Heraclitus]