323 ideas
15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
2196 | The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume] |
15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
2187 | If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume] |
15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
2200 | All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume] |
15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
3807 | Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume] |
15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
6961 | An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume] |
4636 | All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume] |
15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
8649 | Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume] |
2197 | Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume] |
15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
21291 | There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume] |
7700 | We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume] |
15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
11942 | Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume] |
11949 | There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume] |
15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
11950 | We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume] |
11941 | The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume] |
13602 | We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume] |
11098 | Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine] |
7954 | If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume] |
21293 | Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume] |
15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
12048 | The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume] |
13424 | Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume] |
15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
21300 | A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume] |
21299 | Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume] |
15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
1330 | If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume] |
1321 | If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume] |
15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
21302 | If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume] |
21303 | We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume] |
15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
21301 | The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume] |
21290 | Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume] |
1207 | Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume] |
21289 | 'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume] |
21292 | Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume] |
15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
9428 | Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume] |
4766 | Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume] |
2216 | We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume] |
2215 | There is no such thing as chance [Hume] |
15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
2209 | Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume] |
2207 | Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume] |
2208 | Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume] |
2213 | Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume] |
20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
3661 | 'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H] |
2191 | Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume] |
2239 | If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume] |
2237 | It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume] |
15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
2192 | All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume] |
21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
2184 | All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume] |
23631 | Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume] |
2182 | Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume] |
2190 | All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume] |
2246 | If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume] |
2189 | All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume] |
6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume] |
15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
2194 | How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume] |
2183 | We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume] |
21285 | Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume] |
2205 | You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume] |
2186 | We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume] |
2702 | Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume] |
2217 | When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume] |
23421 | If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume] |
3902 | Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume] |
6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant] |
2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
2235 | There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume] |
10328 | We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume] |
2230 | Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG] |
12417 | Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume] |
2238 | Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume] |
2242 | Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume] |
2243 | Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume] |
5548 | Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant] |
2236 | Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume] |
2240 | It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume] |
2241 | The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume] |
15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
7446 | The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking] |
2198 | We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume] |
2204 | All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume] |
2201 | Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume] |
2203 | If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume] |
15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
2199 | Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume] |
2202 | Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume] |
6350 | Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume] |
3598 | Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume] |
15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
21806 | Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume] |
15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
2210 | A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume] |
15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
17712 | General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume] |
8544 | Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
2211 | When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume] |
2212 | An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume] |
2214 | Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume] |
5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume] |
1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume] |
1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume] |
1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume] |
21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume] |
1316 | Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume] |
1333 | Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume] |
1332 | We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume] |
21305 | Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume] |
21307 | Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume] |
21306 | Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume] |
21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
21294 | A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume] |
21295 | When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume] |
21298 | We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume] |
21304 | Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume] |
21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
2222 | The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume] |
2223 | Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume] |
3655 | Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume] |
15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
20030 | If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall] |
2220 | Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume] |
6692 | For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham] |
8257 | Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume] |
22374 | You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume] |
2224 | Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume] |
21103 | Moral questions can only be decided by common opinion [Hume] |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
18552 | Forget about beauty; just concentrate on the virtues of delicacy and discernment admired in critics [Hume, by Scruton] |
6608 | Strong sense, delicate sentiment, practice, comparisons, and lack of prejudice, are all needed for good taste [Hume] |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
2225 | If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume] |
2226 | Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume] |
22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume] |
4008 | Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C] |
8067 | The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume] |
4578 | You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume] |
4581 | Virtues and vices are like secondary qualities in perception, found in observers, not objects [Hume] |
3926 | The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume] |
23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
3650 | Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume] |
3929 | No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume] |
3925 | Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume] |
4580 | All virtues benefit either the public, or the individual who possesses them [Hume] |
3922 | Justice only exists to support society [Hume] |
23560 | If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume] |
21093 | Friendship without community spirit misses out on the main part of virtue [Hume] |
3918 | Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume] |
3919 | Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume] |
3928 | Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume] |
3923 | No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume] |
3924 | Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume] |
21099 | People must have agreed to authority, because they are naturally equal, prior to education [Hume] |
3921 | The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume] |
21096 | The only purpose of government is to administer justice, which brings security [Hume] |
21100 | The idea that society rests on consent or promises undermines obedience [Hume] |
20495 | We no more give 'tacit assent' to the state than a passenger carried on board a ship while asleep [Hume] |
21101 | The people would be amazed to learn that government arises from their consent [Hume] |
21091 | It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume] |
21097 | Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume] |
21092 | Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume] |
3927 | Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume] |
2233 | No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume] |
6703 | Poor people lack the knowledge or wealth to move to a different state [Hume] |
3920 | If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume] |
21094 | There are two kinds of right - to power, and to property [Hume] |
6581 | Hume thought (unlike Locke) that property is a merely conventional relationship [Hume, by Fogelin] |
21102 | We all know that the history of property is founded on injustices [Hume] |
21095 | It is an exaggeration to say that property is the foundation of all government [Hume] |
4677 | If suicide is wrong because only God disposes of our lives, it must also be wrong to save lives [Hume] |
2195 | We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume] |
14301 | We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume] |
15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
2245 | A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume] |
4772 | If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume] |
15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
4579 | The idea of a final cause is very uncertain and unphilosophical [Hume] |
15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
8341 | Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
8344 | At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson] |
8382 | For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane] |
15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
3662 | Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |
4771 | In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume] |
5194 | Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume] |
2221 | A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume] |
2234 | It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume] |
2193 | No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume] |
8422 | Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume] |
19274 | Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume] |
20705 | That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume] |
2218 | In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume] |
15249 | Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume] |
8339 | Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
6959 | We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume] |
6957 | The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume] |
2244 | It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume] |
21255 | No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume] |
21254 | A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume] |
1435 | If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume] |
6962 | The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume] |
6960 | Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume] |
6965 | The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume] |
6967 | Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume] |
21282 | Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume] |
21280 | From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume] |
21281 | This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume] |
21283 | Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume] |
6966 | Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume] |
21284 | This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume] |
21286 | Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume] |
21287 | The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume] |
21288 | Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume] |
21256 | A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume] |
6964 | From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume] |
2232 | You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume] |
21279 | If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume] |
6963 | Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume] |
6958 | How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume] |
7636 | It can't be more rational to believe in natural laws than miracles if the laws are not rational [Ishaq on Hume] |
2227 | A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume] |
2228 | All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume] |
2229 | To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume] |
2185 | The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume] |
15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |
21296 | If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume] |