Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E., Peter Singer and Pierre Gassendi

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


32 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi]
If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Things must have parts to intermingle [Gassendi]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is universalisable - it must involve an impartial and universal view of things [Singer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Following an inner voice for morality is irresponsible in a rational agent [Singer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
The sanctity of a human life depends either on being of our species, or on being a person [Singer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
'Marginal utility' says something is more useful if it is in short supply [Singer]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me? [Singer]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Psychopaths may just be bored, because they cannot participate in normal emotional life [Singer]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
You can't condemn violent revolution without assessing the evils it prevents [Singer]
In Marxism the state will be superseded [Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
If 49% of the population can be wrong, so can 51% [Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Materialist history says we are subject to incomprehensible forces [Singer]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Equality of opportunity unfairly rewards those lucky enough to have great ability [Singer]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
If a right entails having the relevant desire, many creatures might have no right to life [Singer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Why should a potential person have the rights of an actual person? [Singer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Killing a chimp is worse than killing a human too defective to be a person [Singer]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]