33 ideas
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
12155 | Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
12149 | Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
16391 | Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
12151 | If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry] |
18412 | Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
20436 | Art leads to mental health, and mental clarity [Beardsley,M, by Carroll,N] |
15203 | Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
15204 | Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |