22 ideas
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
17750 | The first clear proof of the consistency of the first order predicate logic was in 1928 [Hilbert/Ackermann, by Walicki] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
9758 | To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard] |
9757 | A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard] |
9759 | Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard] |
18678 | Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi] |
18225 | If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard] |
18228 | An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard] |
9760 | Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard] |
18224 | Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard] |
9761 | Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard] |
18233 | Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard] |
18226 | For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard] |