Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Sren Kierkegaard and John Perry

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Fixed ideas should be tackled aggressively [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
I conceived it my task to create difficulties everywhere [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy fails to articulate the continual becoming of existence [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Wherever there is painless contradiction there is also comedy [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Pure truth is for infinite beings only; I prefer endless striving for truth [Kierkegaard]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Subjective truth can only be sustained by repetition [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
I recognise knowledge, but it is the truth by which I can live and die that really matters [Kierkegaard]
Traditional views of truth are tautologies, and truth is empty without a subject [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
The highest truth we can get is uncertainty held fast by an inward passion [Kierkegaard]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
The real subject is ethical, not cognitive [Kierkegaard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
The self is a combination of pairs of attributes: freedom/necessity, infinite/finite, temporal/eternal [Kierkegaard]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry]
Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
If people marry just because they are lonely, that is self-love, not love [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
While big metaphysics is complete without ethics, personal philosophy emphasises ethics [Kierkegaard]
Speculative philosophy loses the individual in a vast vision of humanity [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
For me time stands still, and I with it [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety is not a passing mood, but a response to human freedom [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
The ultimate in life is learning to be anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard]
Ultimate knowledge is being anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard]
Anxiety is staring into the yawning abyss of freedom [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
The plebeians bore others; only the nobility bore themselves [Kierkegaard]
Our destiny is the highest pitch of world-weariness [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Reason is just abstractions, so our essence needs a subjective 'leap of faith' [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
There are aesthetic, ethical and religious subjectivity [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
People want to lose themselves in movements and history, instead of being individuals [Kierkegaard]
Becoming what one is is a huge difficulty, because we strongly aspire to be something else [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
What matters is not right choice, but energy, earnestness and pathos in the choosing [Kierkegaard]
Life may be understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Life is a repetition when what has been now becomes [Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
When we seek our own 'freedom' we are just trying to avoid responsibility [Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Kierkegaard prioritises the inward individual, rather than community [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God does not think or exist; God creates, and is eternal [Kierkegaard]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / d. Religious Experience
God cannot be demonstrated objectively, because God is a subject, only existing inwardly [Kierkegaard]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Pantheism destroys the distinction between good and evil [Kierkegaard]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
We need to see that Christianity cannot be understood [Kierkegaard]
The best way to be a Christian is without 'Christianity' [Kierkegaard]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Without risk there is no faith [Kierkegaard]
Faith is like a dancer's leap, going up to God, but also back to earth [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
Faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity [Kierkegaard]